Wednesday, April 3, 2019

Mubai Flooding Case Study Environmental Sciences Essay

Mubai implosion therapy Case Study Environmental Sciences EssayThe tubepolis of Mumbai that include suburbs and metropolis region of Mumbai stock 39.1 inch (994mm) pelting in undivided solar day on twenty-sixth July 2005. This is a case of inseparable accident in a single metro city where in gourmandize shoes happened beca engagement of ponderous on spot rain piddle and not beca design of typical reasons of violent stream in some(prenominal) bea imputable to everywhere gormandiseing of rivers. ack straightawayledgment of selection of caseThis case is selected because it is being a violent stream function in commercial capital of India which is claimed to be progressing toward becoming city uniform shanghai in terms of infrastructure and facilities. The financial capital of India magnanimous from 10 lakhs to 128 lakhs of population in a decennium but the placement waterways, drains, rivers pick out not been upgraded and updated accordingly. In Mumbai water log ging is a decade old problem and we argon accustomed to it. In 21st ampere-second e precise year on an come 5 days be lost when educational institutions and offices (Mumbai is the financial capital of India) re principal(prenominal) shutting due to heavy rain and flooding during monsoon.The severity of 26th July2005 heavy rainfall and water logging was the attitude when thousands of people died, lakhs were injured and uncountable were abnormal economically and physically. It raises the conterminous need for execution from multiple agencies. It pass aways chance to analyse extremity prepargondness of giving medication agencies, private bodies, NGOs and individual.To solve the problem various forums and agencies atomic digit 18 continuously talking since 1991,but till now nothing has happened as primordial and argona government down not allotted sufficient capital to materialize the issue even after the shocking import of 26th July 2005.During water logging and floodi ng substantial amount of dam upage caused. interrupt transportation cause hampering of economic and financial activities. This hurt industry and dish up sector tremendously .GDP and GNP growth of soil rises to 8.5% where Mumbai growth rank falls 2.1%.Mumbai loses more than 800 crore rupees due to this problem. 3000 crore rupees treated as capital investment. Mumbai has give 80,000crore rupees as revenue to government of India in the year 2005-06 and 22,000 crore rupees earned by government of Maharashtra as duties, taxes, cess in the same year.Objectives of Case StudyThe allurement of info cerebrate to damage to human life and assets by this flood. magisterial compilation of germane(predicate) info to come to the stage of making action mechanism plans, policies and procedures for removing water logging and flooding in Mumbai.To identify promoters responsible for 26 July 2005 flood in Mumbai.Lessons we learn from this tragedy and efforts we atomic number 18 doing to re duce such(prenominal) chances in future. contractments of an efficient methodology which is economical, easy to interpret by charts and chromosome mappings cerebrate to such severe situation very rapidly and start responding fondly. refresh of lock done so far on this issue.Area at a busteder place studyAreas badly affected by floodLower split of Southern MumbaiSea shore argonas of Western MumbaiDensely populated areas of cardinal crashs of MumbaiLower area of Kurla and KalinaRoads and Railways were badly affected by this flood.Responsible reasonsThe sewage organisation of Mumbai commode carry only 25 millimeters of rain water per hour which was extremely inadequate when rainfall was 994 mm. The waste holler transcription was clogged at several places.Heavy rain and senior nobleschool school tide time was same that day due to which 103 outlet supply that connected drains that instantaneously open to ocean breed overflowed. The situation became worsened because drainages were not clean and filled with garbage that blocked the outflow of rain water and it got accumulated on the roads.The severity of situation worsened because warning about heavy rainfall and gritty tide was not given over on time on Radio and Television stations by the civic agencies.The Meteorological department was not having sophisticated weather radars which give the axe give 3 hour prior warning.Massive encroachment on mouth of major nallas and heavy diversions and encroachment of Mithi and other rivers acted as plosive speech sound to rain water running towards river.Development by MMRDA (Mumbai Metropolitan domain Development Authority) without proper environmental clearance growe the pressure on existing drainage system which is already poor and old fashionOld fashioned and poor drainage system.Bandra Kurla complex which is constructed by replace swampy areas the Environment Ministry of the Government of India was in make about its potential adventure and appeal not to sanction it but no action has been interpreted on time.Destruction of mangroves ecosystem for construction and encroachment. This ecosystem exists on the Mithi River and Mahim Creek. This swampy area acts as a buffer amongst kill and sea. Sewage and garbage fling have too destroyed mangroves. The closely acclaimed Mindspace (INORBIT MALL) in Goregaon Malad has been built by destroying a large patch of Mangrooves in Maharashtra.1 http//mdmu.maharashtra.gov.in/pdf/Flood/statusreport.pdfRecorded data from government officesParameterRecorded lossActual loss merciful life loss10942500Spoilt Rickshaw25000370000Taxis damage32504000BEST Buses Damaged745900Trucks and tempo grounded690010000Local Trains damaged4352 cooking expectation from governmentLoopholes in livelyness in actual systemClean and clear drainageHousehold waste filled drainages give major nallas and river banks20 Active out flow supply unless 4 working channel gates1000 trained volunteers for quick r eactionAp stayed procedure and training is pendingResult and Recommendations strategical PlanningFirst is the requirement of suitable methods to make finales when criteria to choose are too many.In makeup Analysis System (IAS) A process that systematically ingress, integrate and analyze the information fragmented in various dependents and fencesitter variables by arranging them in proper hierarchy.To present a raw(a) method of calculating risk luck of flood hazard by analyzing data ga thered from census, belt down use mapping, geomorphic details of land cover. employ the above analyzed and unified data in software the likes of GIS for Hazard mapping. This flood vulnerability risk probability go away give the probability of being flooded when certain aim of rainfall materialize as strong as other finish factors of different aim and sub factors are also present like high tide, maintain of active water gates from sea. It go out also suggest methods to stamp out some fi nale factors or level of sub factors at inhibit time so that loss of life and assets can be reduced.To fancy flood vulnerability probability (FVP) there are set of indigenous data collected from topographic maps, population data of the regional divisions of Mumbai, atlas Thematic Mapping Organization (NATMO), and Statistical Offices respectively.The FVP is calculated for possible inundate areas of Mumbai.FVP is divided into five category very low, low, medium, high and very high. The categories are ground on histogram distribution and the Flood Hazard Maps. Higher the FVP, high the risk of inundation and water logging threat. The flood hazard map presents relevant and accurate analysis through GIS environment.Flood vulnerability probability (FVP)FVP= (Pab-RIWab)RIWabjWhere, FVP = Flood vulnerability probabilityPab = probability of level a of conclusion factor b,RIWab = relative grandness weight of level a decision factor b.RIW abj = relative splendour weight of sub-factor j of level a decision factor b.LevelDecision factorSub factorOverflowed nallahasBlocked nallahasDistance from connecting nallahasLow lying areaLower than average standard of low lying above sea level(ASL)Distance from seaHigh tideOutfalls are narrow sizedRainfall unprocurable pumping facilityFlood mapping and districtFlood hazard zoning pull up stakes help in regulating flood hazard areas background the loss of life and assets in future.Flood sleep withment and nurse will help in land planning, controlling and trouble of water that is a scarce resource. Water needed areas of the countries will get benefitted when flood water will diverted to these areas through proper channeling. Economy of India will die to prosperity when agricultural land and densely populated areas will get sufficient water for farming and drinking drain positioning creation of Mumbai has risen by 60% in last 25 years. Migration to Mumbai is the main cause of increase in population. This caused pressure on existing land for ho exploitation and infrastructure and resulted in encroachment of land, Nallas, and Mithi river and other river banks and on drainage system. Drainage modeling requiresEmphasis on proper land use planningThis is the best method for achieving the goal of Freeing Mumbai from Flood. It requires systematic data collection on the work done in this area and them compiling relevant data to make an action plan. After discussing plan of action with come to authorities testing it in small area , if it work effectively then apply it in all areas of Mumbai in var.s. Mumbai suffers from flood situation when there is heavy rain (or not so heavy rain) and the water does not dispose off in reasonable time. The good known reasons are increasing population, scarcity of land, use of no phylogeny zones, without increasing depicted object of nallahs constructions are done there, diversion of Mithi river to make airport, disappearing of small lakes and ponds increase in slums whose waste directly goes in water ways.Flood in every monsoon season is become severe in low lying areas of Mumbai which become more dangerous in high tide situation because nallahs width in those areas in narrow and inherent drainage is restricted due to new receivements like in SV road and LBS marg. The present drainage system in the city consists of underground single water drainages discharging into the sea through short outfalls. The present drainage system in the suburban areas consists of brooks so rainwater runoff towards there. A system of open surface drain consists here. Massive infrastructure development along with cementing of roads and increasing their heights effects water absorbing cogency. To make haste projects that could curb flooding in Mumbai, finance minister Pranab Mukherjee increased the apportioning for the Brihanmumbai storm water drain (Brimstowad) project in the current fiscal year from Rs200 crore, earmarked during the interim budget, to Rs500 cro re (source DNA ).The project will help the BMC increase the water retention capacity of existing storm water drains. A fact-finding committee appointed to look into reasons for the July 26, 2005, deluge had suggested this as an immediate measure. The Manmohan Singh government, which was at the helm even then, had then agreed to completely gillyflower the Rs1, 200-crore project.Statistics of Mumbais drainage system ne tworkLength of nallahs and drainTypeIsland cityEastern suburbWestern SuburbTotalMajor Nallah(km) comprehensiveness 1.5m990101200Minor nallah(km)Width216642129Drain (km)594051clRoad side open drain2066912971986Closed pipe drain4433686565No. of water entrances27893609170630208System of rainfall disposal in MumbaiOutfallIsland cityEastern suburbWestern suburbTotalDischarge inArabian sea10729136Mahim creek481426Mahul creek4610Thane creek1414Total186Outfalls which are on a lower floor sea level are 45, outfalls which are above sea level but below high tide level are one h undred thirty-five and outfalls above high tide levels are 6.Maintenance of natural drainageThere are many natural drainage in Mumbai. Maintaining them is also one efficient method to reduce emergencies like 26th July 2005 flood.Tulsi lake Its dam have 2 spillways which discharge into Dahisar river and Vihar lake.Vihar lake Its spillways discharge into Mithi river.Powai lake Its discharge also meets Mithi riverMahul and Vakola lake, two branches of Mithi River which were existed till 1976 in the map of Mumbai now disappeared on the cost of development. ontogeny a new action plan for these holding rivers by developing new drain in city and suburbs, and installing new gates and pumping stations is under progress. perplexity of topical anaesthetic disposal and waste integrity effective and sustainable solution is to use efficient, cost effective and machine-driven waste collection and processing technology specifically in metro cities is using effective piping system like shown belo w sort 5. Management of topical anaesthetic anesthetic anesthetic disposal and wasteCAD software gives an integrated drainage design suite that facilitates engineers with powerful but easy to use system convert digital surveyed data into a detailed digital model on ground very quickly. The model can be used to design roadmaps, their alignments and design drainage system, long-sections and sink in-sections with the help of CAD software. These ground models can be used for many other applications like land fill management, mineral extraction. Modified Rational Method used for Drainage designs and Foul drainage entanglements and can be tested for flood conditions using a Powerful Simulation module. Typical flood prevention methods and techniques with sustainable systems such as ingress pavements, paver blocks, parkings and pedestrian walkways shall be used.Research undertaken to come across local anesthetic governments capacity to manage convalescence activities after Mumbai 26t h July 2005 flood has shown that their overall performance in conclusion is, in-consistent and problematic(Mehta Report 2006). The reason was omit of resources and poor planning (K B Singh et al. 2007) the difficulty local officials faced was overleap of proper planning between pre and post fortuity period pick dependence on the state government lack of adequate meter of professionalized staff poor leadership and bureaucratic and legal constraints and the lack of consciousness among powerful citizen and business groups that overshadow local government officials efforts. The locally based reconstructive memory efforts, such as aid that does not meet the postulate of the victims and the possibility to delegate all responsibility on local necessitatement. On the basis of a study of the recuperation processes after the flood of 26 July 2005 in Mumbai, public opinion clearly indicates that government jurisdictions, in particular local governments, have little guidance to direc t their recovery activities.Overcoming recovery execution of instrument problemsIs it possible to overcome the problem of local government capacity to manage the fortuity recovery process? Researchers showed successful local recovery by communities at their own level. I studied 14 municipal Wards (Chembur, Malad, Borivali, Juhu, Goregaon,Vile Parle, Mahalaxmi, Kurla, Bandra, Kandivali, Tardeo, Sion, Matunga, Wadala) recovery processes and found that the speed and quality of recovery appeared . That was the function of three factors (1) nut-bearing intergovernmental relationships, (2) effective competition for scarce resources, and (3) effective management of CBO decision making. Pre disaster planning was not there because nobody at authority level had imagined such terrific flood situation so post flood recovery was slow and unsatisfactory, which encouraged communities in these wards to organize processes for more apropos and efficient action at their own level, clarify key rec overy component parts and responsibilities, identify and secure nancing, and avoid repetition of such emergencies again in future. Many plans are difcult to implement they at least reap our attention to some outstanding features of the recovery process. In particular, they highlight the importance of collective action involving multiple organizations-from some(prenominal) the public and private sectors-which cross governmental jurisdictions.One promising nding from the fate preparedness recovery plans comes from an judgement of the Mumbais roads, railways, drainage system, waste disposal system, municipality proactiveness in future. The citizens and local ofcials improvised a successful adaptive strategy that should implemented in the city directly for managing the recovery process.Inter and intra-community network and the local recovery processI found that the grad of consolidation among organizations that comprise the emergency repartee network prior to flood in Mumbai is a reliable predictor of quickness and response effectiveness in future. In this regard I conveyed the intellect to the Disaster Research Center, the stronger and more well dened the inter-organizational linkages are prior to an event, the seamless subsequent rescue associate activities will go. CBO preparedness is synonymous to Emergency preparedness which requires response effectiveness, and strong structural inter-organizational relations.The role of self-evident natural networks and self-organization in emergency preparedness is necessary and required very much. After 5 years Wards of Mumbai are very considerable in their capacity to respond to 26th July 2005 character emergencies. Emergency groups are now aware about recovery and service processes. This is a particularly important problem in the reconstruction and recovery phase, where competition over resources and CBO redevelopment goals often replaces the immediate post event spirit of cooperation.Conceptual model o f the local recovery processThe response phase of emergency management of flood like situations in Mumbai, some of the lessons learned in that setting whitethorn be transferable to the recovery and reconstruction phases. A innovation of studies suggesting that the capacity of citizens and organizations problematical in recovery to adapt to changing conditions is high and inter-organizational aid delivery systems are more capable of meeting the inevitably and capacities of disaster stricken citizens when intra-CBO and inter-governmental ties are strong.The importance of three key variables related to CBO problem-solving capacity plane consolidation, vertical integrating, and network centralisation. Horizontal integration refers to relations among the individuals and organizations within a community. Thus, a CBO with a high degree of plain integration is rememberd by a tightly knit accessible network with relatively equal power distributions and features frequent, sustained interactions and communications. Conversely, communities with a low degree of plain integration have a weakly knit well-disposed fabric. Vertical integration de-scribes a CBOs relations with extra CBO systems. A CBOs ties with large political, social, and economic institutions may explain resource and information transfers and inuence the bound to which these institutions are dependent on their environment.Network centralization refers to the power and control structure of the network, and whether network links and activities are organized around any particular one or small group of organizations. Integration and centralization are important complementary measures. Integration is a measure of the finis to which organizations in a system are interconnected centralization describes the consummation to which horizontal and vertical cohesion is organized around particular focal points.Horizontal and Vertical Integration and the Role of Focal OrganizationsThe potential relationshi ps between horizontal and vertical integration and depicts four pillowcases of communities. The dominant recovery strategies that characterize each type of CBO. A type I CBO is ideally meet for an effective recovery effort. Communities of this type have well-developed ties to external resources and programs as well as viable horizontal networks that enable it to exert inuence over CBO recovery activities. Such type of communities rely on preexisting stores of social capacity and cohesion are formed in Mumbai they are demonstrate self-organizing behavior.CBO types by degree of horizontal and vertical integration and disaster recovery strategies. Horizontal integration was high owing to the high degree of bet in and experience with political activities on the part of the citizen ship. The local government develops new partnerships and capabilities with its citizens. A cooperative association of households known as the area Survival Network (NSN) was established to facilitate citi zen self-help in future disasters. The high degree of horizontal integration butterflyed a vital role in aiding overlooked minority and low-income populations in rural mountain neighborhoods and in providing a basis for increasing vertical integration. The central Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) utilized the well-established ties developed by the NSN to assess needs and make do assistance. Emergency experienced by the people of Mumbai that day stimulated local horizontal integration. Subsequently, local problem-solving capacity was expanded by vertical integration between federal embossment efforts and local CBO organizations.A type II CBO is an autonomous, relatively isolated CBO with few vertical ties. These types of communities are also formed in Mumbai they have viable horizontal social networks they suffer from a lack of knowledge about and interaction with important external resources. Communities of this type will learn a strategy of cooperation with potential resource s providers, such as the state or federal government. In type II CBO they have a highly active network of, social clubs, and CBO groups. Owing to the high degree of horizontal integration, the CBO rapidly mobilized its limited resources to set up elimination centers, provide food and safe drinking water, and establish communication channel to disseminate recovery information. But the scale of the disaster, coupled with the inexperience of local public officials with central governmental disaster aid programs. The city received assurances from FEMA that they would be helped every step of the way. Corruption and bureaucracy is a part our system that had eaten up a large share of the relief package. despite the public pleadings of civic leaders, governments aid was delayed for several weeks. Meanwhile, people sight that the governments monies would cover only a small portion of the damages.A type III CBO is in a classic state of dependency. They also involved in number in Mumbai la cking a viable horizontal network, it is less likely to take into account local needs, concerns, or determine in the recovery effort. A type III CBO does have the returns of strong vertical ties and carry to facilitate the delivery external aid. They have disproportionate share of disaster-related resources are allocated by the central government. These types of communities will adopt a dual strategy of recovery. Because horizontal cohesion is weak, local polity makers must engage in a strategy based on the cooptation of important constituencies within the CBO. However, owing to strong vertical linkages, these communities will be able to make claims on external resources. In Mumbai such communities are politically powerful communities can rotate normal relief channels and, in effect, coerce the central government into providing massive aid.Overall horizontal integration in such communities is low. Its vertical ties, particularly with corporators and relief and emergency managem ent agencies, are quite strong. As a consequence, these type of communities bypass many of the intergovernmental aid hurdles that other jurisdictions nd so difficult. Indeed, owing to corporators intervention and the high level of government interest, the aid was mobilized with speed. The main point is to ensure that large amounts of government aid poured into the city and to placate affected groups in the communities. Despite the rapid government response, weak horizontal linkages slowed reconstruction efforts as private property owners and local officials squabbled over the details of CBO recovery.A type IV type of CBO is in large number in Mumbai. They face signicant obstacles in undertaking successful recovery efforts because it lacks access to external resources. Even if these vertical channels are trip upd, the lack of intra CBO integration severely limits the ability to man-age the aid process or to inuence the care of recovery efforts. CBO leaders in this situation will nd their strategic options limited to attempting to mediate conict. They had a much lower capacity to cope with the demands of disaster recovery than the communities. Many nongovernmental organization operating in Mumbai after the disaster, with good administrative staff residing in the CBO.A low degree of horizontal and vertical integration was that disaster recovery initiatives were, for the most part, organized outside of the CBO, with little input from the local people. A disaster recovery board was micturated to oversee recovery and reconstruction. Sometimes committee suffers from familiar politics and social resistance.The ability or inability of a CBO to activate horizontal and vertical networks to engage in reconstruction activities is likely related to the presence or absence of focal organizations in the CBO. The focal organizations may or may not governmental entities. Cooperative CBO groups are absolutely capable of taking on this role.The importance of centralized, coor dinating mechanisms in disaster response networks are significant. The key actors at the focal points of emergency response networks tend to play a critical role in the formation and maintenance of inter organizational relationships. It is not yet known just what role centralized personnel play in the recovery and reconstruction processes.ConclusionStudies of communities suffering through the aftermath of large-scale disasters consistently nd that local government ofcials play the critical role in moldable the path of recovery and reconstruction. Strategic choices made by local decision makers both before and after an event determine the success of both the immediate and long-term recovery processes. Communities effective as local decision makers increased and also their ability to act, reason to act, and knowledge of what to do. These ndings highlight the importance of training local government ofcials to cope with CBO needs in the disaster recovery phase has increased.After this flood in Mumbai CBO leaders and local government ofcials take steps before and after such event to enhance the likelihood of achieving successful recovery and reconstruction outcomes analysis.1. Develop a recovery plan based on the strengths and weaknesses of your particular CBO. Local ofcials are proactive in areas prone to such floods and developing a disaster recovery plans that incorporate specic information about the strengths and weaknesses of the area. Although emergency response plans are mandated in most jurisdictions, strategic choices in the recovery phase are often made without prior planning. The recovery plan should incorporate with anticipation and re-silience . Anticipation attempts to avoid hypothesized hazards before the fact (planning) resilience is concerned with dealing with events after they have occurred (learning). The recovery plan should be both realistic and exible.2. Utilize preexisting areas organizations in the recovery process whenever possible.In the recovery model, there are numerous local organizational and citizen capabilities that can be integrated into the recovery process. For instance, horizontal integration can involve organizational collaboration between CBO-based groups and local government. Furthermore, the experience documented by the limited research on disaster recovery shows that vertical integration can be more effective at meeting local needs when activities that strengthen horizontal integration before and during recovery are present. Local government need to know how to use the potentially relevant organizations and policy tools.3. Designate a focal organization or create a recovery response team with representatives of the multiple organizations that will play a leadership role during the recovery process.It is difficult to convince local governments to place a high priority on planning for low-probability of flood. emergent recovery networks operate more effectively if they are managed by a central actor. The focal organization or the recovery team should not attempt to control resources or centralize decision making. Rather, their role will be to facilitate information processing for the other stakeholders in the process.4. Develop and maintain intergovernmental relationships.Successful recovery depends on the timely provision of resources from the state and cental governments. In large-scale disasters, a relatively large number of countries and cities are often competing for the aid and the attention of the same group of relief administrators. The ability to obtain the necessary resources without serious delays depends on the extent to which local ofcials understand the intergovernmental relationships in which the CBO is embedded. Nearly all emergency preparedness plans and programmes prepared by various levels of governments have preexisting relationships with state and central agencies. These relationships will be the starting point for developing intergovernmental partnerships i n times of emergency.5. ensure from other parts of country experiences.Although 26th July 2005 Mumbai flood was unique, there are lessons that can be learned by examining the successes and failures of other parts of country that have been visited by same type of emergency. Local government officials should develop relationships with their counterparts in communities that have been through disasters to share information about the recovery process.Lesson learnedUnplanned urbanization should be stopped immediately especially when ecological balancing element mangroves are destructed.Improving inadequate capacity of existing drainage system by new drainage designs and ensuring there will be no possibility of drainage congestion.Traffic situation should also need modification. RTO should be

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